This paper analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities for income acquisition in nine developed countries during the 1990s. Equality of opportunity is defined as the situation where income distributions conditional on social origin cannot be ranked according to stochastic dominance criteria. We measure social origin by parental education and occupation and use the database built by Roemer et al. (2003) . Stochastic dominance is assessed using nonparametric statistical tests. Our results indicate strong disparities in the degree of equality of opportunity across countries and a strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. The U.S. and Italy show up as the most unequal countries in terms of both outcome and opportunity. At the opposite extreme, income distributions conditional on social origin are almost the same in Scandinavian countries even before any redistributive policy. We complement the ordinal comparison by resorting to an original scalar "Gini" index of opportunities, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return component. In our sample, inequality of opportunity is mostly driven by differences in mean income conditional on social origin, and differences in risk compensate the return element in most countries.
Introduction
As income inequality has risen to the top of the social agenda in many countries, the need for international comparisons has become all the more pressing. Such comparisons provide indications on how different social systems or policies cope with income inequality. Focusing on developed countries, recent studies (Gottschalk and have established important differences across countries in the level of income inequality, with the U.S. and Great Britain being more unequal than most continental European countries, which in turn are more unequal than the countries of Northern Europe.
Although such evidence is informative, it may be criticized for not measuring the kind of inequalities that are relevant from a social, economic or moral perspective. So far, most studies have concentrated on what could be called inequality of outcome, that is, final inequality resulting from the economic, demographic and social process which generates the distribution of income. This concept of inequality has been used for decades and is easy to grasp. However, it does not reflect the views of inequality that are held in the current intellectual and social debates. For instance, influential philosophers such as Dworkin (1981) , Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989) have put the issue of personal responsibility at the forefront of the debate on equality. According to them, economic and social policies should only try to promote equality of opportunity. This amounts to compensate inequality stemming from factors beyond the scope of individual responsibility (circumstances in the terminology introduced by Roemer), while letting, at the same time, individuals bear the consequences of factors for which they can be held responsible. This line of thought was recently introduced in the economics literature by John Roemer in several important theoretical and empirical contributions (Roemer, 1993 (Roemer, , 1998 Roemer et al., 2003) .
Overall, this suggests that greater attention should be paid to the role played by personal responsibility and external factors in observed inequality. In fact, the importance of such an analysis is enhanced by the observation that there is a priori no reason to suspect that equality of opportunity is related to the degree of equality of outcome. Indeed, if some countries tend to promote equality of opportunity over equality of outcome, one may observe a somewhat different ranking of countries according to the two criteria. Furthermore, from a normative perspective, it has been emphasized (Hild and Voorhoeve, 2004 ) that equality of opportunity is consistent with any degree of inequality of outcome. Similar uncertainty as to the relationship between the two notions of inequality has also been recently expressed, from a positive point of view, in the economics literature. While some authors have suggested that higher inequality could increase the incentives to intergenerational mobility and consequently lead to greater equality of opportunity (Checchi et al., 1999) , others have also stressed that higher inequality could raise the constraints to mobility and decrease equality of opportunity (Hassler et al., 2000; Solon, 2004) .
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Its first objective is to offer an international comparison of inequality that echoes more closely the views on inequality held in contemporary societies and that is consistent with modern theories of justice. For this reason, we measure and compare the extent of equality of opportunity for income acquisition in developed economies. This complements results already obtained regarding the comparison of inequality of disposable income. The second objective is to examine how countries' performance in terms of equality of opportunity relates to their degree of inequality of outcome.
et al., 2006) . Together with other authors (Van de Gaer, 1993; Roemer, 1998) , we take the view that studying inequality of opportunity amounts to a comparison of conditional income distributions. Our definition focuses on the comparison of income distributions conditional on circumstances using stochastic dominance tools. We complement this ordinal criterion of equality of opportunity by developing an original index of inequality of opportunity, derived from the Gini inequality index. We further show that our inequality of opportunity index is decomposable into two components: risk and return.
An major issue in the implementation of these measures of equality of opportunity lies in the definition and the observation of the individual circumstances that should be taken into consideration. In this paper, we concentrate on individual socio-economic background. Our analysis rests on a data set gathered by Roemer et al. (2003) that conveys information on individual income and socio-economic background in nine countries: Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the U.S. It contains detailed information on most sources of individual income, as well as information, albeit more limited, on the education of the father of the respondent.
Since our data differ from those commonly used in international comparisons of income inequality, we first check that they deliver results on inequality of outcome that are comparable to those found in the literature, before turning to the analysis of equality of opportunity. With respect to inequality of disposable income, we also rank countries according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance which is known to be more robust than using inequality indexes. In the comparisons of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity we pay particular attention to issues of statistical inference, in contrast to many empirical analyses. To this end, we implement robust non-parametric tests of stochastic dominance that have been developed recently (Davidson and Duclos, 2000) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition of equality of opportunity for income acquisition, the statistical procedure and an index of inequality of opportunity. The data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses inequality of outcome. Section 5 compares inequality of opportunity among the nine countries and analyzes the relationship between income inequality and inequality of opportunities. Section 6 concludes.
Equality of Opportunity: Definition and Measurement
When measuring inequality of outcome in empirical work, a wealth of different approaches and indexes can be used. On the contrary, when departing from the analysis of outcome to examine opportunity, one is first required to provide a definition of equality of opportunity that can be implemented empirically. individuals can be judged responsible for and that can be generically referred to as effort. Following Roemer (1998) we define a type as the set of individuals with similar circumstances. One important principle emphasized by equal-opportunity theories is that differences in circumstances are not a morally acceptable source of inequality. On the contrary, inequality arising from differences in effort does not require any compensation. As a consequence, any level of inequality of outcome can be compatible with equality of opportunity. However, when equality of opportunity prevails, no particular vector of circumstances should provide individuals with an advantage over any other vector. This characterization allows us to derive a condition for equality of opportunity that can be implemented empirically.
In order to derive this condition, one first needs to be more specific about the notion of advantage that some circumstances s may provide over some other circumstances s′. Consider the situation where individuals would be allowed to choose their circumstances (before knowing the level of effort they will exert). In this context, we say that s provides some advantage over s′, if all individuals prefer the opportunity set associated with s to the one associated with s′. Consequently, we say that equality of opportunity prevails between circumstances s and s′ if s is not preferred to s′ by all individuals, and vice versa.
In the case of income acquisition, the opportunity set offered to an individual with circumstances s can be summarized by the distribution of income x conditional on s, denoted F(x|s). Let S denote the set of all possible vectors of circumstances. Choosing among elements of S amounts to choosing among income lotteries whose distribution is given by F(x|s). Obviously, the characterization of equality of opportunity outlined in the previous paragraph is contingent upon the preferences used to rank these lotteries. A desirable property of the characterization of equality of opportunity is that it holds for a sufficiently broad class of preferences. In this paper, as in a first attempt made by Van de Gaer (1993) , stochastic dominance criteria are used to rank the opportunity sets offered by different circumstances. We assume that individual preferences agree with the criteria of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) and second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). We now define FSD and SSD, for two lotteries F(x|s) and F(x|s′) and explain what restrictions on preferences they imply. 
Strict dominance (s ՝ FSD s′) requires that for some x, strict inequality prevails. This requirement has been previously proposed and discussed by Van de Gaer et al. (2001) . It is well known that under Expected Utility Theory (EUT), any individual whose utility function is increasing in x will prefer an FSD-dominating distribution over an FSD-dominated one. The FSD criterion determines a partial ranking on the set of possible circumstances S. Non-dominated circumstances can be defined for the binary relationship FSD as
The FSD criterion is very demanding, when comparing lotteries, since it requires the unanimity of decision makers regardless of their attitudes toward risk (i.e. risk-loving, risk-averse, etc) .
A less partial ranking can be defined using the SSD criterion, which allows us to partially rank lotteries even when FSD is not satisfied. 
In the EUT framework, any risk-averse individual whose utility function is increasing in x will prefer an SSD-dominating distribution over an SSDdominated one. Shorrocks (1983) has shown that SSD is equivalent to generalized Lorenz (GL) dominance. Formally:
with GLF(.|s)(p), the value of the generalized Lorenz curve at p for the distribution F(.|s).
The set of non-dominated circumstances for SSD , P2, may be defined in a similar way to P1. Since SSD is a less partial criterion than FSD, we have P2 ⊆ P1.
We are now able to offer a formal definition of equality of opportunity according to the SSD criterion. We say that equality of opportunity is achieved when no s is dominated for the SSD criterion. Formally:
Definition 3: Equality of opportunity is achieved whenever P2 = S.
This definition is equivalent to saying that an individual choosing among all possible circumstances is unable to rank them using the SSD criterion.
Discussion
Four aspects of our definition of equality of opportunity are worth emphasizing.
First, our definition admits as a special case the equality of conditional distributions, i.e. when for all (s, s′) in S 2 , and for all x, F(x|s) = F(x|s′). In such a situation, circumstances have no impact on the distribution of income. This represents a compelling case of equality of opportunity and corresponds to the definition of equality of opportunity adopted by Roemer (1998) . Indeed if the conditional distributions are identical, so are the quantile functions. Then according to Roemer's interpretation, the outcome for any degree of effort measured by the rank in the conditional income distribution is independent of circumstances. It may be seen as a situation of strong equality of opportunity. Of course, such a situation is unlikely to be satisfied in practice. In this perspective, our definition of equality of opportunity is less stringent and corresponds to a weaker form of equality of opportunity. Figure 1 summarizes the relationship between the different definitions of equality of opportunity.
Second, when our definition of equality of opportunity is not satisfied, it must be the case that some circumstances s dominate some circumstances s′ according to the SSD criterion. Schematically, this may occur for two reasons. The returns to the lottery attached to s may be higher than those of s′, or the risk of the lottery attached to s may be lower than that of s′. The FSD criterion only rests on the comparison of returns, while the SSD criterion takes both returns and risk into consideration.
From an ethical perspective, the rationale for using SSD or FSD in the characterization of equality of opportunity depends on the nature of the factors that affect individual outcomes. One popular model is the one developed by Roemer where outcomes are considered the product of effort and circumstances and individuals are implicitly assumed to know their level of effort. In this case, individual outcome is not uncertain, the FSD criterion is sufficient and considering the SSD criterion is, in fact, inappropriate and inconsistent. But if outcomes remain uncertain once circumstances have been determined, resorting to the SSD criterion is justified. This uncertainty may arise, for example, if outcomes are to some extent determined by luck, as discussed in Van de Gaer (1993) , in which case using the SSD criterion is fully justified. In the more general setting where luck, effort and circumstances play a role in shaping income distribution, the SSD criterion can still be defended if the impact of effort and luck cannot be disentangled in the data.
1 Presumably, this is a fairly general situation since measuring effort raises important and deep difficulties. In that case, the conditional distribution for a given type is a product of effort and luck. This risk component is the key argument for choosing SSD over FSD as the criterion on which to anchor the empirical definition of equality of opportunity. Accounting for risk is one of the distinctive features of our analysis with respect to previous proposals made in the literature.
Third, when using the SSD criterion it may be informative to assess the degree of risk of each lottery, regardless of its return. This can be performed by comparing the conditional distributions centered on their mean, using the standard Lorenz criterion. Let LF(.|s) (p) denote the value of the Lorenz curve at p for the distribution F(.|s), the s lottery will be said to be less risky than that of s′ if:
1 See Lefranc et al. (2006) for more developments. 
Fourth, the definition of equality of opportunity, either strong or weak, is contingent on the definition of the relevant circumstances. However, given data limitations, it is unlikely that all circumstances will, in practice, be observable. Any concept of equality of opportunity has to cope with incomplete information. One may wonder if incomplete observation of the relevant circumstances may distort the empirical assessment of equality of opportunity. We address this issue in two companion papers (Lefranc et al., 2004 (Lefranc et al., , 2006 and show that the two concepts of equality of opportunity brought out here are fairly robust to an incomplete description of the circumstances.
Measurement

Stochastic Dominance Tests
The condition developed in the previous section suggests a natural empirical test to assess whether equality of opportunity prevails: first, estimate the conditional income distributions associated with observed circumstances and then compare these distributions using second-order stochastic dominance tools. When comparing two GL curves, three situations can occur: (a) one curve lies above the other; (b) the two curves intersect; (c) the two curves are identical. Our definition implies that equality of opportunity prevails in case (b) or in case (c). It is violated in case (a). Case (c) corresponds to strong equality of opportunity. In practice, we estimate the conditional income distributions and we perform non-parametric stochastic dominance tests at the second order. Our tests implement the procedure developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000) and are presented in the Appendix.
For two sub-populations A and B, we perform the following two tests independently: (1) we test the null hypothesis of equality of the distributions of A and B; (2) we test the null of SSD of distribution A over B and vice versa.
If we fail to reject the null of test (1) ). In that case, we give priority to the result of test (1) since it is a more powerful test of equality of distributions for any significance level. Hence, in that case, we conclude that strong equality of opportunity is rejected but that equality of opportunity, as defined by Definition 3, is not rejected.
rejected. At the cost of a loss of generality, it is also possible to build an index allowing us to measure the degree of inequality of opportunity.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to wonder what minimal properties such an index must satisfy. Borrowing from the literature on inequality indexes (see for instance, Sen, 1997) , it seems reasonable to require the following properties.
( by a positive scalar. This list of properties defines a large class of indexes of equality of opportunity. Among it, we construct and use a particular index, whose appeal is its relation to the most popular index of inequality, the Gini index.
Our proposition is inspired from the approach of Van de Gaer (1993) and Ooghe et al. (2007) . It focuses on the opportunity sets to which people have access and tries to make these sets as equal as possible. First we need to define a measure of the opportunities offered to individuals with given circumstances (a type in Roemer's terminology) in the space of lotteries. Here we borrow from the literature on the measurement of opportunity sets (see Peragine (1999) for a survey). We measure the feasible opportunity of a given lottery by the area under its GL curve. Indeed, any lottery dominated according to the GL criterion belongs to this set. In an influential contribution to the measurement of opportunity, Pattanaik and Xu (1990) axiomatized the cardinal of a discrete set as a measure of opportunity. Among the axioms introduced by the authors, the monotonicity property reads as follows. Given an opportunity set A and an opportunity y which does not belong to A, A ഫ y offers more opportunity than A. When the opportunity set is continuous, counting elements of the opportunity set does not make sense any more. A natural extension is to consider the area below the opportunity set as a cardinal measure of opportunity; for instance, Bensaid and Fleurbaey (2003) suggested this measure when the opportunity set is a budget set. Now, let us rank all circumstances according to twice the area under the GL curve, starting from the smallest one. For type s, whose population share is ps, this area is equal to μ s s G 1− with m denoting the mean and the G the Gini coefficient.
2 The Gini opportunity (GO) index is defined by:
It computes the weighted sum of all the differences between areas of opportunity sets. Dividing by the mean income of the entire population m makes this index independent of the wealth of the society. This index can be viewed as an extension of the Gini coefficient since, when there are as many circumstances s as individuals, GO is equal to the Gini coefficient, i.e.:
Therefore the GO index takes its value between 0 and 1. Comparison of equations (5) and (6) shows that GO(x) Յ G(x) and that the Gini opportunity index increases with the number of types. An advantage of this index is that it is closely related to the definition of equality of opportunity based on GL curves.
A Decomposition Between a Risk and Return Component
As shown by equation (4), the opportunity set of a type is the product of two components: a return component, equal to the average income ms, and a risk component, 1 -Gs which depends on within-type inequality. These two components interact in a multiplicative way which makes the problem of decomposition different from the usual case of decomposing income inequality by additive factor components. We propose a decomposition of the GO index between a return component and a risk component. The two components are computed without making a reranking of types, namely the ranking of types remains that according to twice the area under the GL curve.
Let us define the pure return component GOpt(x) as the value of the GO coefficient when within-type income inequality is fully erased. Van de Gaer (1993) proposed use of the inequality of expected conditional outcomes as a measure of inequality of opportunity. We define the pure risk component GOpr(x) as the value of the GO coefficient if between-type inequality of per capita income is removed.
GO x p p
A decomposition involving both pure contributions reads
where the third term is an interaction term between the return and risk components not too easy to interpret.
The fact that there is no reranking before computing GOpt(x) and GOpr(x) has one important consequence. Both indexes may take negative values. It may arise for GOpt(x) if the per capita income for some top group is smaller than that for some bottom group. If the ranking of the types according to the GL dominance test is not ambiguous, it should not arise since GL dominance implies mean dominance. So in practice, the GOpt(x) will be positive in general and the absence of reranking does not matter. It is not the case for the GOpr(x) which may be negative if some bottom type is less risky than some top type. As a matter of fact, GOpr(x) incorporates a correlation between risk and mean income defined at the type level. A positive value indicates that on average the top types are less risky than the other types and a negative value the opposite. So the interest of the risk contribution is to assess whether the risk element strengthens or reduces the return element in measuring the inequality of opportunity of social lotteries.
A potential shortcoming of decomposition (7) is that the interaction term can be large in practice. It is possible to provide an exact decomposition of the GO index by resorting to an alternative definition of the risk and return components. To understand the construction of the alternative decomposition, it is important to note that the GO index is defined by a series of pairwise comparisons of GL curves for all possible (ordered) pairs. In the previous decomposition, the return and risk components were respectively defined by equalizing the return across all types and setting risk equal to zero for all types. In the alternative decomposition the definition of the risk and return components assumes that return or risk have only been equalized pairwise, for all possible pairs of types.
Specifically, the contribution of between-type inequality of returns to the inequality of opportunity, GOt(x), is equal to the value of the GO index where for each pairwise comparison, within-type inequality has been equalized and set to the arithmetic mean of the Gini coefficient of the two types. Hence, GOet(x) is defined by
It is important to note that GOet(x) differs from the pure return term because within-type inequality has not been erased but equalized pairwise.
The alternative risk component, GOer, is equal to the value of the GO index when between-type inequality has been equalized in each pairwise comparison. That is, for all pairs (i, j), it is assumed that the mean income of each type is equal to the arithmetic mean income of the two groups. The only source of inequality of opportunity among the two types comes from differences in within-type inequality. Formally, we have:
In the same way GOer(x) is not a pure risk term since average income for each group may still differ in the hypothetical distribution used to define GOer(x). One should note that each of the two contributions GOet(x) and GOer(x) includes some part of the interaction terms in (8). Hence, their interpretation is not as straightforward as for the two pure terms. But the advantage is that the two contributions sum up to the total inequality of opportunity measured by the Gini index of inequality of opportunity and it is simple arithmetics to prove that:
Data requirements for comparing inequality of opportunity for income acquisition across countries turn out to be even more stringent than for comparing inequality of outcome. Indeed, the reliability of the empirical analysis calls not only for comparable measures of individual disposable income. It also requires that individual background be measured in a comparable and homogeneous way across countries.
Data Sets and Sample Selection
The data used in the empirical analysis come from household surveys and micro-economic administrative data for nine countries: Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the U.S. Data were collected during the first half of the 1990s. For each country, the data sets include information on individual and household income, both pre-and postfisc, as well as information on individual family background. As discussed below, the latter information will be used to identify individual circumstances. Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the data sets used for each country. These data were put together by national experts for the purpose of a previous international comparison of income inequality and equality of opportunity, the results of which were presented in Roemer et al. (2003) .
research (e.g. the Luxembourg Income Study, the OECD, the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) or the World Bank data sets 4 ) is that it provides information on individual circumstances, besides information on individual income. Hence, being able to relate individual income to individual circumstances in nine developed economies makes the data set used here extremely valuable. One further advantage of these data is that they include information on Sweden and the Netherlands, two countries that are often absent from international comparisons of income inequality.
Samples used in the rest of the paper are restricted to male heads of households aged 25-40 at the time of the survey (25-50 in West Germany). This age interval is relatively narrow, so we do not expect differences in the age composition across countries to have a strong impact on our results. Further restricting our sample to a narrower age interval would lead to sample sizes that would be too small to perform robust dominance analysis. One possible limitation of our age restriction is that it leads to sample individuals relatively early in their lifecycle. Since the returns to experience are positively corrrelated with education and, consequently, with social background, this could lead to understatement of the extent of inequality of lifetime opportunities (see for instance, Grawe, 2006) . For this reason, the estimates of the extent of inequality of opportunity presented here should be seen as a lower bound.
Main Variables
Individual Circumstances
Defining the exact set of individual circumstances is a deep and debatable question. Besides, in empirical work, observing this entire set is clearly out of reach. In this paper, we examine the dependence of individual opportunity on a restricted set of circumstances, namely circumstances relating to individual social origin, measured by parental education or occupation. Of course, social origin may influence individual outcomes through a variety of channels such as economic or genetic inheritance, or the transmission of preferences. Our interest lies solely in determining the extent to which social background influences individual opportunity sets. Identifying these different channels is not the topic of this paper. In fact, from the point of view of equality of opportunity, most authors would agree that substantive (as opposed to formal) equality of opportunity requires compensating the influence of social origin on individual outcomes, regardless of the channel through which it operates, as social origin lies beyond individual responsibility and choice (see for instance, Dworkin, 1981; Arneson, 1989; Roemer, 1993) . Nevertheless, we recognize that this egalitarian principle may conflict with other social objectives or ethical values. For instance, if the influence of social origin is driven by the intergenerational transmission of talent, equality of opportunity will go against allocative efficiency. In the light of recent philosophical debates, it can also be argued, from a normative point of view, that the above notion of equality of opportunity may contradict other ethical principles such as self-ownership and freedom. For instance, the influence of social origin may be driven by the genetic transmission of individual traits. In this case, the self-ownership principle claims that differences of outcome due to such constitutive traits should not be compensated (see for instance, Vallentyne, 1997) . In our view, these two criticisms do not challenge the consistency of the above notion of equality of opportunity or dispute the relevance of the comparison undertaken here. But they suggest that there may be a trade-off between different social and ethical objectives. Admittedly, this should be investigated empirically using a more detailed description of the individual circumstances. However, the data at our disposal prevent us from undertaking such an analysis of the different channels at work. But it is often the case that international comparisons are made at this price.
For most countries in our data, individual social background is measured by the level of education of the father. The only two exceptions are France and Great Britain, for which we only observe the occupational group of the father. For each country, we partition our sample in three categories, Ed1 to Ed3, where Ed3 denotes (a priori) the most advantaged social background. When using father's education, we account for specificities of national educational systems. When using information on father's social group the classification is as follows: for France, (1) farmers and manual workers, (2) clerks, and (3) professionals and self-employed workers; for Great Britain, (1) farmers and unskilled manual workers, (2) clerks and skilled manual workers, and (3) professionals and self-employed workers.
5 Table 2 presents the classification of social background in each country, as well as the number of observations in each category. In partitioning our samples according to social background, two constraints had to be taken into account: first, the need for sub-samples large enough to allow for the estimation of conditional income distributions; second, the requirement of a meaningful partitioning, with respect to each country's educational and social structure. As a consequence of these two constraints, the comparability of our classification across countries remains imperfect. In particular, one should be aware of differences in the relative size of each group across countries. 6 In France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and the U.S., each group represents between one quarter and one half of the overall population. This does not hold for Belgium, West Germany, Italy and Sweden, where one group represents less than one fifth of the overall population. More specifically, the distribution of the population among the three types seems particularly unbalanced for West Germany. It may induce a downward bias for inequality of opportunity in this country and this should be kept in mind when analyzing the extent of equality of opportunity in Section 5. We focus on two measures of individual income: gross pre-fisc annual household income and net disposable annual household income.
8 Analyzing both income measures allows us to examine the impact of fiscal redistribution on inequality of outcomes and opportunity.
Since household income (both pre-and post-fisc) incorporates a variety of different income sources, similar sources should be taken into account for each country in order to ensure cross-country data comparability. Gross pre-fisc income includes labor income (from both salaried and self-employed workers) and asset income. The only exception is Belgium for which neither self-employment nor Notes: Number of observations and number of years of education of the parents for the different sub-samples.
-, information about the occupational group of the parents has been used. capital income is available. Using data for France, a country that is close in economic terms to Belgium, we performed a sensitivity analysis and conclude that excluding self-employed individuals has a minor impact on measured inequality of both outcome and opportunity. The lack of capital income leads to an underestimation of inequality and inequality of opportunity. However, it is well known that capital income is poorly reported in many household surveys.
Labor income is measured gross of any employee share of social security contributions. Taxes taken into account are income tax as well as housing and property taxes. Transfers include unemployment benefits, all social security benefits (related to sickness, disability, maternity, poverty, etc), pensions, child or family allowances and means-tested benefits. Details of income sources taken into account, for each country are provided in Appendix Table A1 . To account for differences in household size, income is normalized using the OECD equivalence scale. Household income is divided by the square root of the number of household members. Since we do not want cross-country differences in income per capita to influence our comparison of inequality of outcome and opportunity, for each country we divide household income by the country's mean household income.
Inequality of Outcome
Before analyzing equality of opportunity, we first compare the extent of inequality of outcome in the countries of our sample. Several papers have already compared the extent of income inequality across countries, using harmonized data. The interest of the comparison undertaken here is twofold. First, it can be seen as a test of the validity of the data used in this paper. In fact, our results broadly concur with those of previous analysis. Second, while most comparative papers have concentrated on the analysis of inequality indexes, we also compare relative inequality across countries using the Lorenz dominance criterion. The interest of this criterion lies in its greater generality. We also pay particular attention to issues of statistical inference and implement Lorenz dominance tests. 9 We first discuss the ranking of countries that emerges from these tests before performing a comparison with the results of other studies based on inequality indexes.
Lorenz Dominance Tests
One way to get a first picture of income inequality in the nine countries is to compare the shape of the income densities. The densities are estimated logarithmically using kernel estimation.
10 Figure 2 gives the densities of the distribution of disposable income centered around their means. The American distribution is reproduced on each graph to make comparisons easier.
The comparison of these densities reveals important differences across countries in the distribution of income. The contrast between Sweden and the U.S. is striking, with a fairly symmetric distribution concentrated around its mean for the first one and a strong right skew for the second one. The differences between other European distributions and the American one are less sharp. Norway shares with 9 The methodology of these tests is presented in the appendix. 10 A Gaussian adaptative bandwidth kernel estimator has been used.
Sweden a large mode but its distribution is less concentrated than the Swedish one. The case of Belgium seems to be fairly similar to these two Nordic countries. The shape of the distribution in the Netherlands, France and Germany is comparable and lies in an intermediate position between Sweden and the U.S. The British density is closer to the American one than to the distribution in continental Europe, with the exception of Italy. This last country displays a distribution fairly close to the American and British ones.
To obtain a more precise picture of inequality we consider Lorenz curves. Figure 3 shows Lorenz curves for disposable income in each country. As for income densities, the American curve is represented on each graph. Their analysis corroborates our previous comments. In the top left panel, it is apparent that the Belgian Lorenz curve is above the French curve, which itself dominates the U.S. one. In the top right panel, it can be seen that the Netherlands and West Germany have a similar level of inequality. The bottom left panel confirms that inequality is pretty much the same in Great Britain, the U.S. and Italy. Finally, in the bottom right panel, the significant gap between Scandinavian countries and the U.S. is apparent.
This visual inspection is confirmed by the results of the Lorenz dominance tests for each pairwise comparison (Table 3) . These results do not lead to a complete ranking of the countries. However, three groups of three countries emerge from these tests. The first group consists of Sweden, Norway and Belgium. The second one includes France, West Germany and the Netherlands. The third one is composed of Great Britain, Italy and the U.S. The hierarchy between the three 
Notes:
The symbols read as follows: > The row dominates the column. < The row is dominated by the column. groups is obvious. All countries in the first group Lorenz-dominate the countries of the second and third groups; the countries of the second group Lorenzdominate the countries of the third one. The within-group ranking is less clear. Within the first group, any pairwise comparison leads to an indeterminacy. The apparently low level of inequality in Belgium may partly be ascribed to the fact that our Belgian data do not take asset income into account. Within the second and third groups, for each pairwise comparison, dominance tests conclude to either equality or crossing of the Lorenz curves, except for the comparison between the Netherlands and West Germany, for which the latter dominates the former.
Comparison with Other Studies
In order to assess the reliability of our data, we now compare our results to those obtained in other studies, using harmonized income data. To this end, we estimate scalar indexes of relative inequality in the nine countries. Estimates are reported in Table A2 , with bootstrapped standard errors in brackets. For obvious reasons, inequality indexes (Gini, CV) and inter-quantile ratios presented in Table A2 suggest a ranking of countries that is similar to the one established in the previous section. Within-group differences in inequality indexes are not statistically significant, while between-groups differences are.
One natural benchmark to gauge the reliability of our income data is to compare our results to those obtained in Gottschalk and , using data from the Luxembourg Income Study for the early 1990s. Three points should be emphasized. First, our relative ranking of countries is to a large extent consistent with the results presented in their studies. Second, for most countries, our estimates of inequality indexes are lower than those reported in their studies. This may largely reflect differences in sample selection rules, and in particular the fact that we have restricted our samples to a narrower age interval.
11 Third, two noteworthy differences appear regarding the level of inequality and the ranking of two countries: France and Italy. In our data the former appears less unequal and the latter more unequal than in Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) , both in absolute and relative terms.
12 Regarding France, the difference can be explained by the fact that we use data from 1994, compared with 1989 or 1984 in their study. Moreover, Hourriez et al. (2001) demonstrate that disposable income inequality decreases slightly between these dates. Regarding Italy, their data refer to 1991, a year for which measured inequality is markedly lower than in adjacent years, in particular 1993, the year used in our study. For Italy as well as more generally, our results seem close to those of other studies, in terms of both levels of inequality and ranking of the countries: Bertola et al. (2001) find a Gini of 0.348 for disposable income with LIS data in 1994, and rank Italy among the more unequal countries in Europe. The same conclusion emerges from Atkinson (1996) , OECD (1998) and , who establish an overall ranking similar to ours. Sastre and Trannoy (2001) find very similar results for Gini indexes using LIS data.
Overall, our results closely mimic those obtained in various sources our data, which suggests that we should be reasonably confident in the validity of our income data for international comparisons of inequality. We now turn to the analysis of inequality of opportunity.
Equality of Opportunity for Income Acquisition
The above conclusions for inequality of outcomes may not prevail for inequality of opportunity. In fact, in a country with limited inequality of opportunity, there can still be important differences in individual success (hence important inequality of outcome) if individuals exert very heterogeneous effort levels. Conversely, a low level of inequality of outcomes is compatible with important differences according to social origin. We first test for equality of opportunity and then analyze differences in the return and risk of income lotteries conditional on social origin. Lastly, using our index of inequality of opportunity, we examine how countries' performance in terms of equality of opportunity compares to their ranking in terms of overall inequality. Figure 4 draws the conditional distributions for primary and disposable income in each country. Again, for each country, income is expressed as a fraction of the country's mean income. The results are then dimension-free and fully comparable to the results obtained for inequality of outcome. Not surprisingly, having more educated parents is associated with a higher level of income. Indeed in every country but Norway, Sweden and West Germany, the CDF for individuals from more privileged origin is always below the CDFs for individuals coming from the two less privileged social backgrounds.
Dominance Tests
These graphs also reveal important differences between countries in the magnitude of the advantage conferred by more privileged backgrounds over less privileged ones. Intuitively, this advantage corresponds to the gap between the CDFs corresponding to the different social backgrounds. As apparent from these graphs, this distance varies strongly from one country to another. For Sweden, the three conditional distributions for Ed1 to Ed3 are strikingly close, suggesting that differences in social background translate into very small differences in income. The same holds true, to a lesser extent, in Norway where the gap between the income distributions of the different backgrounds is rather modest.
This stands in marked contrast with the situation in Italy and the U.S. where the gap between the three distributions is important. In Great Britain, the advantage conferred to the most privileged group is still quite large, but the gap between the second most privileged group is less wide than in the U.S. and Italian cases. Moreover, the income distributions of groups Ed1 and Ed2 are closer together than in Italy and the U.S., suggesting more equality of opportunity in this country at the bottom of the social ladder.
The rest of the countries in our data (Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands) exhibit an intermediate degree of inequality of opportunity. There are significant differences in the income distributions offered to individuals according to their social background. However, the distance between these distributions is smaller than in Italy and the U.S. It should also be noted that in the former group of countries, especially in Belgium, inequality of opportunity is more pronounced at the bottom of the social hierarchy, to the extent that the gap between the distributions of groups Ed1 and Ed2 is larger than the distance between Ed2 and Ed3. This contrasts with the situation in Italy, Great Britain and the U.S. However, these differences in the locus of inequality of opportunity may partly reflect differences in the classification used to partition our sample according to social background rather than national specificities.
Whether equality of opportunity prevails can be formally assessed using stochastic dominance tests. To complement visual inspections in terms of FSD offered by Figure 4 , the results according to SSD appear in Table 4 . 13 In fact, in almost all cases dominance results are also obtained for FSD, except mostly for Germany.
14 The only country in which our equality of opportunity criterion is satisfied for all groups is Sweden. In fact, this country exhibits a situation described previously as strong equality of opportunity, as the pairwise tests suggest equality of the three conditional distributions. It should also be stressed that this strong requirement holds for both primary and disposable income.
In all other countries, according to our definition, equality of opportunity does not prevail. There exists at least one social background whose income distribution is dominated by that of another group. It is nevertheless possible to rank these countries according to the number of times the statistical tests conclude to dominance in the three pairwise comparisons. In this respect, when focusing on comparisons of disposable income, West Germany is the second least unequal (in terms of opportunity) since equality prevails in one case and non-comparability in two other cases. Great Britain, Belgium and Norway come next with two cases of dominance and one equality.
Lastly, in France, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.S., the three tests conclude to dominance at the second order, indicating that the hierarchy of social backgrounds apparent on the graphs of the CDFs is indeed very robust.
In all countries but two, Belgium and West Germany, the results of the dominance tests for primary income are identical to the results for disposable income. This can be interpreted as the weak impact of redistributive policy on equality of opportunity as it is measured here. Hence redistributive policy is not able to fully neutralize the effect of the initial background on the economic success of the next generation. Nevertheless Figure 4 reveals that redistributive policy tends to partially offset the impact of social origin on individual income: in all countries the CDFs for primary income, conditional on social background, are always further apart than the CDFs for disposable income.
Risk and Return of the Social Lotteries
Using standard tools in risk theory, it is also possible to compare the income lotteries attached to different social backgrounds in terms of their return and risk. Since for most countries, the tests conclude to first-order stochastics among social backgrounds, we already know that the expected income (i.e. the return) is usually larger for the more favored social background. However, whether the lotteries offered to the most advantaged type are also less risky remains an open question. 
Ed1
An Almost Equal Risk of Conditional Lotteries
To focus solely on risk, we examine conditional distributions centered around their means, and we draw Lorenz curves of these centered distributions. Comparing two distributions, if the Lorenz curve of the first distribution is above the Lorenz curve of the other, then the first distribution will be preferred by all risk-averse individuals, whatever their degree of risk-aversion. Table 5 contains 
the results of the Lorenz dominance tests. The sequence of tests is similar to the one used for stochastic dominance. These results suggest that the degree of risk 15 of the income lotteries associated with social background tends to be rather similar. For most countries, the Lorenz curves of the different types are very close, especially for disposable income. Regarding the tests, there is a surprisingly large proportion of pairwise comparisons for which we conclude to the equality of the Lorenz curves: 18 of 27 times for primary income and 15 of 27 times for disposable income. Even if we exclude all cases in which the uncentered distributions are already equal, we conclude that there is equality of the Lorenz curves in about half of the cases. In each country there is at least one pairwise disposable income comparison for which equality holds.
All three conditional distributions display the same degree of risk in four countries for primary income (France, West Germany, Sweden and the U.S.) and two countries for disposable income (Sweden and Belgium). For these countries, the equality of risks suggests that the impact of the family background may simply be captured by a scale parameter. As a first approximation, in these countries, the distribution of income conditional on social background, takes the following multiplicative form:
where xis denotes the income of individual i with social background s, E(x|s) is the expectation of income conditional on s, and ei is a random term independent of social background. It should be stressed that equality in the degree of risk of the different distributions is an interesting special case where the ranking of the distributions can be achieved based solely on a comparison of the returns.
When equality of risks does not hold, the tests conclude to the crossing of the Lorenz curves in one fourth of the cases. When the conditional Lorenz curves can be ranked, the table indicates that less privileged backgrounds face more risky income lotteries than more privileged ones in all cases for primary income, but only in one third of the cases for disposable income. This indicates that redistributive policies tend to lower the risk of the worst social lotteries. For instance, France faces a situation of perfect equality of risk in primary income, but after income tax and transfers, the lottery corresponding to the more privileged type is riskier than the other two. Suppose that we are ready to assume, following Roemer, that the dispersion of incomes within a type is the result of effort only. Then a policy aimed solely at reducing inequality of opportunity should leave the level of risk unchanged. Under this assumption, which is admittedly quite strong, we conclude that the French redistributive policies are not solely motivated by equality of opportunity as defined by Roemer.
Inequality of Return and Inequality of Risk
So far our appraisal of risk relies on ordinal comparisons. We now implement our cardinal measure, the GO index, and its decompositions (7) and (8) to provide additional empirical evidence, though at the price of lower robustness. Table 6 gives the values of the contributions of the return and the risk component according both decompositions.
It clearly appears that the magnitude of the risk contribution is similar for the two decompositions. The interaction term is absorbed by the return term in the exact decomposition (8). Since the interaction term is quite large (between 20 and 45 percent in absolute value of the GO index) our comments will focus on the exact decomposition.
In the making of inequality of opportunity, inequality of returns stands out as the dominant force. This comes as no surprise in view of the previous ordinal analysis. What is more interesting is that in two thirds of the countries, the risk contribution is negative, meaning that risk is lower in less privileged types. In these countries, inequality of risk mitigates inequality of opportunity and this effect is quite strong in France, West Germany and Norway. The opposite occurs in Belgium, Italy and the U.S. where risk inequality exacerbates inequality of opportunity. When assessing the robustness of this finding, one should however keep in mind the results of the risk dominance tests of Table 5 ; while they indicate that in Italy, the least privileged type is significantly more risky than the most privileged one, the difference in risk is not significant for Belgium and the U.S.
It is instructive to visualize how these two components of inequality of opportunity shape in inequality of opportunity. The values of the two exact contributions are plotted against the values of the GO index in Figure 5 . The positive correlation which emerges from the inspection of both panels is rather impressive and indicates that a good performance of a country according to equality of opportunity is associated with reducing both return and risk inequality among types.
Inequality of Opportunity vs. Inequality of Outcomes
We now examine the relationship between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes among countries. To do so, we use the Gini index and the Gini Opportunity index, since resorting to a cardinal measure of inequality makes comparisons easier. The values of these indexes are presented in Table 7 . Regarding the extent of inequality of opportunity, three groups of countries stand out: a first group composed of Sweden, Norway and West Germany, with the lowest inequality of opportunity; an intermediate group composed of Belgium, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands; and a group with high inequality of opportunity composed of Italy and the U.S. Figure 6 shows a positive correlation between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcomes. Sweden and Norway are the least unequal countries according to both concepts, while the U.S. and Italy are the most unequal ones. The correlation between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome is of course far from perfect, but with these data the coefficient of correlation is 16 If we draw a line that joins the two polar cases, two groups of outliers stand out: Belgium lies above the line, Great Britain and West Germany are below. These special cases should not be overinterpreted because of the limitations of the data for these three countries. Overall, the strong positive correlation between equality of outcome and equality of opportunity indicated in Figure 6 confirms the conclusion of several recent papers that have provided evidence of a negative link between intergenerational mobility and income inequality, for instance Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Solon (2004) .
If inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity seem to go hand in hand, it may still be the case that equality of opportunity policy entails some cost in terms of GDP per capita. If a country with high inequality of opportunity also has a high GDP per capita, the welfare of the least advantaged type in this country may be higher than in a country that exhibits both lower inequality of opportunity and lower GDP per capita. This kind of phenomenon cannot be detected by our measure of inequality of opportunity since the opportunity set of a type is normalized to the mean income. Hence, it does not take into account differences across countries in the level of well-being reached by each type. For this reason, Figure 7 examines the relationship between equality of opportunity and living standard. It suggests that there is no trade-off in our sample between per-capita income and equality of opportunity, as illustrated for instance, by the case of Italy and the U.S., which both display a large degree of inequality of opportunity and stay at both ends of the income level spectrum. This sort of efficiency equality trade-off has already been discussed in Bourguignon et al. (2007b) . 16 If we were to exclude the U.S. and Italy from our graph, very little dependence would have been detected between the extent of inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity. The coefficient would be estimated at 0.187. Of course the omission of these two large countries would have hampered the study. This observation tells us that the positive correlation between the two concepts of inequality may depend on which country is included in the sample. This paper provides an international comparison of the extent of inequality of opportunity for income in nine developed countries. Our empirical analysis rests on a definition of equality of opportunity which is an alternative to and weaker than John Roemer's definition. Whereas Roemer's original definition requires that the distributions of income conditional on type be identical across types; we define equality of opportunity as a situation in which there is no unanimous preference for one particular conditional distribution over any other among risk-averse individuals behind the veil of ignorance. We complement this ordinal comparison by relying upon an original index of inequality of opportunities, derived from the Gini inequality index, which can be decomposed into a risk and a return component.
Using the statistical methodology of Davidson and Duclos (2000) for comparing Generalized Lorenz curves, we evaluate the hypothesis of equality of opportunity by testing for second-order stochastic dominance across income distributions conditional on social background. Overall, we find considerable differences in the degree of inequality of opportunities across countries. There is only one country-Sweden-for which the hypothesis of equal opportunities could not be rejected. For Sweden, in fact, not even the strong (Roemerian) definition could be rejected. The proposed Gini index of opportunities is the lowest for Sweden, Norway and West Germany, and highest for Italy and the U.S. The primary component of inequality of opportunity is the differences in average income between types. Differences between types in the degree of risk play a smaller role and, in most countries, they tend to slightly compensate for the differences in returns. The Gini index of opportunities is positively, but imperfectly, correlated (0.67) with the standard Gini coefficient for income inequality. Still, the analysis highlights that inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity can sometimes lead to different pictures. For instance France and the Netherlands experience a similar level of inequality of income but the former country is much more unequal than the latter from the point of view of equality of opportunity; a similar situation arises when comparing the U.S. and Great Britain. This may reflect different policy choices regarding what conception of equality to promote.
Obviously, more countries should be analyzed to obtain a more complete and definite picture of the potential contrast or congruence between inequality of outcome and inequality of opportunity in the developed world. Since the dominant picture seems to be a rather strong correlation between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity, a further investigation into understanding in depth the link between the mechanisms reducing or enhancing both types of inequality is called for.
Appendix: Statistical Tests
The testing procedure has been developed in Davidson and Duclos (2000) . It can be applied to any order of stochastic dominance. In this appendix we illustrate the case of second order stochastic dominance test. First, we estimate the Lorenz or the General Lorenz curves with their non-parametric estimator. From a sample of size NA, LA represents the estimated Lorenz curve of distribution A, and SA its variance-covariance matrix. To compare the Lorenz curves of distributions A and B, we compute the difference of the two estimated vectors, noted g = LA -LB. Insofar as the distributions A and B are independent, the global variancecovariance matrix is given by: S = SA + SB.
To test the equality of the Lorenz curves: the null hypothesis is given by H0: g = 0. It is then possible to show (see for example, Beach and Davidson, 1983; Davidson and Duclos, 2000) that under H0 the estimated vectorγ is asymptotically normal, then:ˆ, To test equality of the two Lorenz curves A and B, one only needs to compare the value of the statistic T1 with a c 2 at 5 or 1 percent. To test relative dominance (i.e. LA dominates LB), the two hypotheses are H 0 : γ ∈ + » k against H 1 : γ ∉ + » k . The Wald test statistic with inequality constraints has been developed by Kodde and Palm (1986) and Wolak (1989) . The statistic T2 defined by: with ||x|| = x′S -1 x. Kodde and Palm (1986) 
